Summary. We study the least core, the kernel and bargaining sets of coalitional games with a countable set of players. We show that the least core of a continuous superadditive game with a countable set of players is a nonempty (norm-compact) subset of the space of all countably additive measures. Then we show that in such games the intersection of the prekernel and the least core is non-empty. Finally, we show that the Aumann-Maschler and the Mas-Colell bargaining sets contain the set of all countably additive payo measures in the prekernel. JEL Classi®cation Number: C71.
economies with a continuum of agents. Shitovitz [19] deals with the MasColell bargaining set in mixed market games. Einy et al. [8] study the Mas-Colell bargaining set in convex games with a measurable space of players.
The present work deals with the least core, the kernel, and the AumannMaschler and Mas-Colell bargaining sets for superadditive games with a countable set of players. The least core was introduced by Maschler, Peleg and Shapley [13] , where they study its relation to the kernel and the nucleolus. It is well known that the core of a continuous game with a measurable space of players, if it is non-empty, consists of countably additive payo measures (e.g., Schmeidler [17] ). Here we show that the least core of a continuous superadditive game with a countable set of players is a nonempty norm-compact subset of the set of all countably additive measures de®ned on the set of coalitions (see Theorem A).
The kernel of a cooperative game was introduced by Davis and Maschler [5] . Since then it has been the subject of many studies. Originally it was regarded as an auxiliary solution concept whose main task was to illuminate the properties of the Aumann-Maschler bargaining set. Nevertheless, the kernel possesses interesting mathematical properties, and re¯ects in many ways the structure of the game. The prekernel is a simpli®ed version of the kernel which is not restricted to individually rational payos. We show that in continuous superadditive games with a countable set of players the prekernel (and hence the kernel) and the least core have a non-empty intersection. The proof of this result uses ®nite approximations. Wesley [21] proved by using non-standard analysis that under some conditions the kernel of a superadditive game with a countable set of players is non-empty (for every coalition structure). We show that Wesley's conditions imply that the game is continuous. We also give an example of a continuous game which does not satisfy one of Wesley's conditions (see Lemma 4.3 and Example 4.4) . Thus, Wesley's result is a special case of our result when the coalition structure includes only the grand coalition.
The ®rst de®nition of a bargaining set for cooperative games was given in Aumann and Maschler [1] . Recently, several new concepts of bargaining set have been introduced (see Maschler [11] for a survey). Davis and Maschler [4] and Peleg [15] proved that the Aumann-Maschler bargaining set is nonempty in a coalitional game with a ®nite set of players. We show that in continuous superadditive games with a countable set of players, the Aumann-Maschler bargaining set contains the set of all countably additive payo measures in the prekernel, and thus it always contains a countably additive payo measure (see Theorem C).
Mas-Colell [14] proposed a bargaining set which is a modi®cation of the Aumann-Maschler bargaining set. One of the advantage of the Mas-Colell bargaining set is that it can be de®ned for games with a continuum of players. Mas-Colell [14] showed that in atomless pure exchange economies his bargaining set coincides with the set of competitive equilibria, and he pointed out that in ®nite coalitional games, the prekernel is always contained in his bargaining set (see also Vohra [20] ). In the de®nition of the Mas-Colell bargaining set it is not assumed that payos are individually rational. We show that in continuous superadditive games with a countable set of players the Mas-Colell bargaining set contains the set of all countably additive payo measures in the prekernel, and thus it always contains an individually rational countably additive payo measure.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the basic de®nitions and the preliminary results which are relevant to our work. In Section 3 we prove that the least core of a continuous superadditive game with a countable set of players is a non-empty norm-compact subset of the space of all countably additive measures on the set of coalitions. In Section 4 we show that in continuous superadditive games with a countable set of players the least core and the prekernel have a non-empty intersection. In Section 5 we prove that in continuous superadditive games the bargaining set of Aumann and Maschler and that of Mas-Colell contain the set of all countably additive payo measures in the prekernel.
Basic de®nitions and preliminary results
In this section we de®ne some basic notions we use throughout and prove some preliminary results.
Mathematical preliminaries
Let x be the set of natural numbers. The set of subsets of x is denoted by 2
x . The set of all functions f X x 3 f0Y 1g is denoted by f0Y 1g
x . Note that f0Y 1g
x is a compact metric space (as the product of countable metric spaces), and convergence of sequences in this metric is identical to pointwise convergence. Every P 2
x can be naturally identi®ed with its indicator function 1 P f0Y 1g
x . The correspondence 231 induces a metric on 2 x under which it is compact. It is well known that a sequence f n g I n 1 converges to (written lim n3I n ) in this metric if and only if lim n3I n lim n3I n Y where lim n3I n I n 1 x we have lim n3I v n v whenever n 7 or n 8 .
Proof. We prove the non-obvious part of the lemma. Let P 2
x . Assume lim n3I v n v whenever n 7 or n 8 . We show that v is continuous at . Let f n g I n 1 be such that lim n3I n Y that is lim n3I n lim n3I n . We show that lim n3I v n v. For each n let e n I k n k Y and f n I k n k . As v is monotonic and e n & n & f n for each nY then ve n v n vf n for each n. Now, e n1 ' e n and lim n I n 1 e n . Also f n1 & f n Y and lim n I n 1 f n . Thus, e n 7 and f n 8 . Hence by our assumption lim n3I ve n lim n3I vf n vY and therefore lim n3I v n vX u
We now recall some standard de®nitions and results from measure theory which are used throughout the paper. A ®nitely additive measure on 2
x is a function l X 2 x 3`which satis®es le f le lf whenever e and f are two disjoint subsets of x . The measure l is called countably additive if for every countable family fe i g I i 1 of disjoint subsets of x we have
It is well known that l is countably additive i it is continuous at x . A ®nitely additive measure l on 2
x is called purely ®nitely additive if there is no non-negative and non-zero countably additive measure k such that ke le for all e P 2
x . We note that if l is non-negative, then it is purely ®nitely additive i it vanishes at every ®nite subset of x . A theorem of Yosida and Hewitt (e.g., Theorem 1.23 of Yosida and Hewitt [22] ) asserts that any ®nitely additive measure can be uniquely decomposed into a sum of a countably additive measure and a purely ®nitely additive measure.
The Banach space of all bounded ®nitely additive measures on 2 x with the variation norm is denoted by . Its closed subspace consisting of all countable additive measures is denoted by . It is well known that is naturally identi®ed with the dual space of l I l I x Y which is the Banach space of all bounded sequences of real numbers. Also, can be naturally identi®ed with l 1 l 1 x Y i.e., every x P l 1 corresponds to l x P , where
x . The following lemma plays an important role in our work. Lemma 2.2. Let u be a weak Ã -compact subset of ba that contains only countably additive measures (i.e., u & ). Then u is norm-compact.
Proof. Since u & Y we can view u as a subset of 1 . As is the norm-dual of I Y which in turns is the norm-dual of 1 Y the weak Ã topology induced by on u coincides with the weak topology induced by 1 on u. Hence u is a weakly compact subset of 1 . Since 1 is a separable Banach space, the weak topology on its weakly compact subsets is metrizable (see e.g., Theorem 3.V.6.3 in Dunford-Schwartz [7] ). Therefore u is weakly sequentially compact in 1 . By Schur's Theorem (see Diestel [6] , page 85, and Corollary 14 page 296 of Dunford-Schwartz [7] ), weak convergence and norm convergence of sequences are equivalent in 1 ; hence u is norm-compact in 1 X u We conclude this subsection with some de®nitions concerning nets which will be used in the proof of Theorem B.
A directed system is a pair hY "Y where h is a set and " is a binary relation on h such that the following holds:
(a) If a " b and b " cY then a " c. (b) If aY b P hY then there exists c P h such that a " c and b " c. A net is a mapping of a directed system into a topological space . We usually write x a for the value of the net at a P h and fx a j a P hg (or simply fx a g) for the net itself. We say that fx a g converges to a point x P if for every open set y containing x there exists a 0 P h such that x a P y for all a # a 0 . Let fx a j a P hg be a net. For every a P h let b a P h be such that b a # a; then the set fx b a j a P hg is called a subnet of fx a j a P hg.
For a further discussion of nets and related notions the reader is referred to Kelley [10] , p. 65 72.
Game theoretic preliminaries
We refer to the members of x as players, and to each subset of x as a coalition. A game is a bounded function v X 2 x 3`satisfying vY 0Y and for which there is k P such that v ! k for every P 2
x . (Note that the later requirement is satis®ed for every non-negative set function v with k 0X A game v is superadditive if v ! v v for every two disjoint coalitions Y P 2
x . Throughout this paper we assume that all games under consideration are superadditive, but to avoid confusion we emphasize it in the statements of the results. Note that every k P is continuous, and that if v ! k for all Y then vÀk is a monotonic function. Hence by Lemma 2.1 a game v is continuous on 2
x if and only if lim n3I v n v whenever n 7 or n 8 . Note that our de®nition of continuity coincides with that of Schmeidler [17] (see also Aumann and Shapley [2] ).
For every game v and every coalition P 2 x Y we de®ne
where in®mum is taken over all ®nite partitions
that r v i vfig for every i P x . Note also that r v P . Moreover, r v is the largest measure in such that r v v for all P 2 x ; that is, if k P and k v for all P 2
x Y then k r v (pointwise). Also, if v is continuous then r v P .
A payo measure (or a preimputation) is a measure k P such that kx vx. A payo measure k is individually rational if k ! r v . An imputation is an individually rational payo measure. The set of all imputations is denoted by sv.
The least core
Recall that the core of a game v, denoted by gvY is the set o all imputations l P sv such that l ! v for each P 2
x . For every k P let f k supfv À k j & xg. The least core of the game vY denoted vgvY is the set of all imputations l P sv for which f attains its minimal value on sv. Note that since f is the supremum of ane weak Ã -continuous functions, it is a convex and lower semicontinuous function on . As sv is a weak Ã -compact subset of Y f attains its minimal value v on sv. Therefore vgv is a non-empty convex weak Ã -compact subset of sv. We note that v ! 0Y and v 0 if and only if gv T Y. In this case gv vgv.
Theorem A. Let v be a superadditive continuous game. Then vgv is a nonempty convex norm-compact subset of .
Proof. By Lemma 2.2 it suces to prove that vgv & . Without loss of generality (w.l.o.g.) assume that r v is identically zero. (Alternatively, we could replace the game v with the game w v À r v , which is also continuous and satis®es l P vgw if and only if l r v P vgvX Also w.l.o.g. assume that vx 1. Finally, we may assume that v b 0Y as otherwise the result follows from Schmeidler [17] .
Let l P vgv. By Theorem 1.23 of Yosida and Hewitt [22] , l can be uniquely decomposed into a sum of a non-negative countably additive measure l and a non-negative purely ®nitely additive measure l p (i.e., a measure l p satisfying l p 0Y for each ®nite P R. We must show that l p is identically zero. As l p is non-negative, it suces to show that l p x 0. Assume that l p x b 0. We show that this implies that maxfv À l j P 2 x g b v . This leads to a contradiction since maxfv À l j P 2 x g (which exists because v À l is continuous) is bounded above by v . Indeed, let P 2 x Y and for every n P x de®ne n f1Y F F F Y ng. Then
In the remaining of the proof of Theorem A assume that l p x b 0. The proof proceeds in several steps. Assume by way of contradiction that l x 0. Then l l p . As l P vgvY v À l v Y for every P 2
x . As v is continuous, we have lim n3I v n vx 1. Since l l p and l p n 0Y we have v n À l n v n Y for each nX Therefore v ! v n for each nY and thus v 1. Let n P sv be given for each P 2 x by n iP 2 Ài . As v À n is continuous, there is
Summing up these inequalities we have
which is a contradiction. Hence l x b 0.
STEP 2: We show that the payo measure k
STEP 3: We show that maxfv À l j P 2 x g b v Y and we will get the desired contradiction.
For every P 2
x we have v À l ! v À l. As l P vgvY we have supfv À l j P 2 x g v . Hence maxfvÀ l j P 2 x g ! v . We show that this inequality is strict. Assume to the contrary that maxfv À l j P 2
x j j P g. The set f1 j P C j g is a closed subset of f0Y 1g
x in the topology of pointwise convergence, and therefore it is compact. Let P C j be such that v 
Note that k P . Moreover, since k 0 , we have kx 1Y and therefore k P sv. We show that maxfv À k j P 2
x g` v Y and this will contradict the de®nition of v . Let P 2 x , T Y. We distinguish two cases.
(a) & 0 . In this case we have
The following example taken from Kannai [9] 
&
It is easy to see that the core of v is not empty, and therefore it coincides with the least core. Since a payo measure l P is in the core of v if and only if l 0 for each ®nite P 2 x Y the least core of v contains only purely ®nitely additive measures.
Remark. The least core for games with a ®nite set of players was de®ned by Maschler, Peleg and Shapley [13] as the set of all payo measures l for which
is attained at k lY where s Ã v is the set of preimputations. It can be easily veri®ed that for games with an empty core our de®nition applied to a game with a ®nite set of players coincides with the above de®nition. However, if gv T Y then vgv gv according to our de®nition, whereas the original de®nition may yield a strict subset of the core. In this work we restrict ourselves to solution concepts which are individually rational. Therefore we use our de®nition which also turn out to be more convenient from the technical point of view.
The kernel
The set of all payo measures in a game v is denoted by s Ã v; that is
Also for iY j P x Y i T jY and l P de®ne
The prekernel of v is the set
The kernel of v is the set
The notion of the kernel of a coalitional game with a ®nite set of players was introduced by Davis and Maschler [5] . It is well-known that if v is a superadditive game with a ®nite set of players, then uv uv (see Theorem 2.7 in Maschler, Peleg and Shapley [12] ). It is also well-known that for such games uv vgv T Y. In fact, the nucleolus of v is contained in this intersection (see Corollary 6.7 in Maschler, Peleg and Shapley [13] , and Theorem 3 in Schmeidler [16] ). Theorem B below establishes that the prekernel (and hence the kernel) and the least core have a non-empty intersection for continuous games.
Theorem B. Let v be a superadditive continuous game. Then uv vgv T Y. In particular, uv contains an individually rational countably additive payo measure.
We need the following lemmas. Proof. Let l P and let fl n g I n 1 & be such that lim n3I kl n À lk 0. We show that for each iY j P x Y i T jY lim n3I s ij l n s ij l. Note that the set f1 j P T ij g is a closed (and therefore a compact) subset of f0Y 1g
x in the topology of pointwise convergence. Since v is continuous and each l n P Y v À l n attains its maximum on T ij . For each n P x let n P T ij be such that s ij l n v n À l n n Y and similarly let P T ij satisfying s ij l v À l. Since v À l ! v n À l n for every n P x Y we have
Also we have v n À l n n ! v À l n for each n P x .
As kl À l n k 3 0Y lim n3I v n À l n n v À l. Hence,
Let w be a superadditive game with a ®nite support (i.e., for some n ! 1Y w f1Y F F F Y ng wY for all P 2 x ). Then uw vgw T Y.
Proof. W.l.o.g. assume that w ! 0. Let R f P 2 x j & f1Y F F F Y nggY and let u be the restriction of w to R. Since w is superadditive , u is a superadditive game with a ®nite set of players. Therefore by Theorem 2.7 in Maschler, Peleg and Shapley [12] , we have uu uuY and by Corollary 6.7 in Maschler, Peleg and Shapley [12] , we have uu vgu T Y.
Let l P uu vgu. De®ne " lfig lfigY 1 i n 0Y otherwise.
&
Obviously " l P Y and therefore there is Ã P 2 x such that
Now,
As l P uu vguY we get from 4X1 and 4X2 that " l P uw vgwX u With these results at hand we can now complete the proof of Theorem B.
Proof of Theorem B. Assume, w.l.o.g., that r v is identically zero and vx 1. For every n P x let n f1Y F F F Y ngY and let v n be the game given by v n v n . By Lemma 4.2, for each n P x there is l n P uv n vgv n . As the games v n are continuous, then by Theorem A, l n P for each n. Let " w be the weak Ã -closure in of the set w fl n j n P xg. We show that " w is a norm-compact subset of . This yields that the sequence fl n g I n 1 has a subsequence which converges in the norm to a member of uv vgv. As " w is a weak Ã -compact subset of Y then by Lemma 2.2 it suces to show that " w & . Moreover, since w & Y it suces to show that each l P " wnw is a member of . Let l P " wnw. Then there exists a net fl na j a P hg in w which converges to l. Let k P vgv. By Theorem A, k P . We distinguish two cases (note that k ! 0 and kx 1).
(1) At least one the following holds:
1 The net fk na j a P hg does not converge to 1. 1 The net fv na g does not converge to 1. 1 There exists a coalition such that the net fv na g does not converge to v.
We show that if 1 is satis®ed then l is countably additive (the proof that l is countably additive when 1 or 1 are satis®ed is similar). Now 1 implies that there exists a subnet of fk na j a P hg that converges to a number P [0,1). Assume, w.l.o.g., that fk na j a P hg itself converges to . Let b 0 be such that `1Y then there is a 0 P h such that for each a # a 0 (here # denotes the order relation on h) we have k na ` `1. As lim n3I k n 1Y there is n 0 P x such that k n b for every n b n 0 . Thus, for each a # a 0 we have na n 0 X Let P 2
x . As fl na g converges in the weak Ã -topology to lY the net fl na g converges to l. Hence there is b 0 P h such that for each b # b 0 we have jl nb À lj`. From the de®nition of a net it follows that there is c P hY such that c # a 0 Y and c # b 0 . Therefore nc n 0 Y and jl nc À lj`. Thus we have shown that if 0``1 À is given, then for each P 2
x there is 1 n n 0 such that jl n À lj`. Since the set f1Y F F F Y n 0 g is ®nite and can be chosen arbitrarily small, there is 1 n n 0 such that l n l.
We now show that this implies that l P . Assume that f l g I l 1 & 2 x is a non-decreasing sequence of coalitions such that I l 1 l x . Then for every l P x there is 1 n n 0 such that l n l l l . Therefore there is a subsequence fl k g I k 1 & x Y and 1 n n 0 Y such that l lk l n lk for each k P x X As l n P sv n Y lim k3I l n lk 1. Therefore lim k3I l lk 1. Now fl l g I l 1 is a non-decreasing and bounded sequence of real numbers, and therefore it converges. As fl l k g I k 1 is a subsequence of fl l g I l 1 which converges to 1, we have lim l3I l l 1. Thus, l P .
(2) Case (1) does not hold. We show that in this case l P vgv and thus by Theorem A it is countably additive. As k P vgvY then for each a P h and all & x we have
Since k na converges to 1, we assume, w.l.o.g., that k na b 0 for each a P h. We have shown that in any case l P . Thus, " w & , and therefore it is norm compact in . As the sequence fl n j n P x g & " wY there is a subse quence fl nk g I k 1 which converges in the norm to a member l of . As lim k3I l nk lim k3I v nk 1Y and lim k3I v nk v for each P 2
x Y an argument identical to the one given in (2) above yields l P vgv. Let iY j P x Y i T j. Since l nk P uv nk for each k P x Y we have s ij l nk s ji l nk . By Lemma 4.1, lim k3I s ij l nk À Á s ij l Y and lim k3I s ji l nk s ji l. Therefore s ij l s ji lY and thus l P uv. Hence, uv vgv T YX ( Wesley [21] showed by using non standard analysis that a non negative game v has a non empty kernel (for every coalition structure) if it satis®ed the following conditions:
We show that 4X3 and 4X4 imply that v is continuousY and then we give an example of a continuous game which does not satisfy 4X4. Thus, Wesley's Theorem is a special case of Theorem B when the coalition structure is fx g. Lemma 4.3. Assume that v is a non negative superadditive game which satis®es 4X3 and 4X4. Then v is continuous.
Proof. Let P 2
x . We ®rst show that if f n g I n 1 is a non decreasing sequence of coalitions such that I n 1 n Y then lim n3I v n v. Indeed, if
As v is monotonic we have
for every m ! " mn. Thus by 4X3, lim n3I v n v. Assume now that f n g I n 1 is a non-increasing sequence of coalitions such that I n 1 n . We show that lim n3I v n v. For e & x we de®ne re iPe r i . Then r P . Let n P x Y and let f P 2 x be such that f Y. We show that v f À vf rf. De®ne f n f f1Y F F F Y ng. Then by (4.4) v f n À v rf n X As f n1 ' f n Y and I n 1 f n fY by what we have just shown, lim n3I v f n v f. Since lim n3I rf n rf), we have
As f was an arbitrary coalition, for each n P x we have 0 v n À v v n n À v r n nX As lim n3I r n n 0Y we have lim n3I v n vX u
We give an example of a non-negative continuous game which does not satisfy (4.4). .4) is not satis®ed. As it was mentioned above, Maschler, Peleg, and Shapley [13] showed that for superadditive games with a ®nite set of players the kernel coincides with the prekernel. By Theorems B there are always countably additive payos measures in the kernel and the prekernel of a continuous superad-ditive game on 2
x . Using the compactness of 2 x the same proofs as those of Theorem 2.4 and Theorem 2.7 in Maschler, Peleg, and Shapley [13] yield. 
Bargaining sets
In this section we establish that the Aumann-Maschler and the Mas-Colell bargaining sets of a continuous game with a countable set of players are nonempty sets which contain the set of all countably additive payo measures in the prekernel.
Let v be a game, let l P sv, and let iY j P x Y i T jY be two players. An
P eY ke veY and kfkg b lfkg for each k P e. A counterobjection of j to eY k is a pair fY n such that n P Y n ! r v Y f & x Y j P fY i a P fY nf vfY nfkg ! lfkg for k P fneY and nfkg ! kfkg for k P e f. A justi®ed objection of i P x to j in l is an objection which does not have a counterobjection. The Aumann-Maschler bargaining set (see Aumann and Maschler [1] ) of v is the set fv of all imputations l P sv such that no player i has a justi®ed objection to another player in l.
Davis and Maschler [4] , and Peleg [15] showed that if v is a game with a ®nite set of players, then fv is a non-empty set. For this class of games, Davis and Maschler [5] proved that uv is a subset of fv. Theorem C below establishes that if v is a continuous game, then the set of all countably additive payo measures in the prekernel is contained fv.
Theorem C. Let v be a superadditive continuous game. Then uv & fv. In particular, fv contains a countably additive payo measure.
Proof. W.l.o.g. assume that r v is identically zero. Let l P uv . We show that l P fv. Assume to the contrary that l a P fv. Then there are iY j P x Y i T jY such that j has a justi®ed objection eY k to i in l. By the Yosida and Hewitt Theorem [22] , k can be uniquely decomposed into a sum of a non-negative countably additive measure k Y and a non-negative purely ®nitely additive measure k p (note that k ! r v Y and thus k ! 0. As k p vanishes on ®nite subsets of x Y we have k fkg b lfkg for each k P eY and k e ke ve. Since any counterobjection to eY k is also a counterobjection to eY kY eY k is a justi®ed objection. Since v is continuous and l P Y there is f P 2
x such that i P fY j a P fY and
Then nf vf by the last inequality, and if k P e fY nfkg k fkgY and if l P fneY then nflg lflg. Therefore each member of f (and in particular player i) has a counterobjection to the objection eY k of j, which contradicts the fact that eY k is a justi®ed objection. Now by Theorem A, uv vgv & uv . Therefore by Theorem B, fv contains a countably additive payo measure. u Mas Colell [14] proposed a notion of bargaining set dierent from that of Aumann and Maschler bargaining set, and showed that in the context of a market with a continuum of players, this new bargaining set coincides with the set of walrasian allocations. The advantage of the Mas-Colell bargaining set is that it can be de®ned for games with an uncountable set of players.
The following de®nitions are taken from Einy et al. [8] , who provide a straightforward generalization of the Mas-Colell [14] de®nition to games with an in®nite set of players. Let v be a game, and let l be a payo measure in v. An objection to l (in the sense of Mas-Colell) is a pair eY k such that e P 2
x , and k P satis®es ke ve, ke b le, and kf ! lf for every coalition f & e. A counterobjection (in the sense of Mas-Colell) to the objection eY k is a pair gY n such that n P Y andng vgY 5X1 A justi®ed objection is an objection which has no counterobjection. The MasColell bargaining set of v is the set wfv of all payo measures which have no justi®ed objection.
Mas-Colell [14] in considering exchange economies with a continuum of agents, de®nes the bargaining set without restricting attention to individually rational allocations. Thus, his equivalence result holds for a large set. From the point of view of an existence result it will be interesting to show that the Mas-Colell bargaining set always contains an individually rational payo measure. Theorem D below establishes that the Mas-Colell bargaining set of a continuous game contains the set of all countably additive payo measures in the prekernel. As a consequence, for these games the Mas-Colell bargaining set contains an individually rational countably additive payo measure.
Theorem D. Let v be a superadditive continuous game. Then uv & wfv. In particular, wfv contains an individually rational countably additive payo measure.
The following lemma will be useful in the proof of Theorem D.
Lemma 5.1. Let v be game, and let l be a payo measure in vX If eY k is a justi®ed objection to l, then vf kf e lfne for each f P R.
Proof. Assume to the contrary that there is f P R such that vf b kf e lfne. Then f T Y. Let vf À kf e lfne. Choose t P fY and let d t be the probability measure concentrated on ftg. De®ne n P by n k f e l fne d t X Thus, if P R satis®es & e f we have n ! kY and if P R satis®es & fne we have n ! l. Also nf vf b kf e lfneX Thus fY n is a counterobjection to eY kY which is a contradiction. u
Proof of Theorem D. W.l.o.g. assume that r v is identically zero. Let l P uv . We show that l P wfv. Assume by way of contradiction that l a P wfv. Then there is a justi®ed objection eY k to l. Since l is a payo measure, e T x . Assume, w.l.o.g., that ke ve. Since eY k is a justi®ed objection to l, by Lemma 5.1 for each f & e we have kf ! vf. For each P 2 x let v e v eY and k e k e. Then k e is in the core of the game v e . Since v e is continuous, k e P . As ke b le, there is j P e such that k e fjg b lfjg. Let i P x ne. As l P uvY there is g & x Y i P gY j a P gY such that vg À lg s ij l ! ve À le. Since k e fjg b lfjg, an argument identical to the one given in the proof of Theorem C yields vg b kPeg k e fkg kPgne lfkg ke g lgneX By Lemma 5.1 this contradicts the assumption that eY k is a justi®ed objection to l. Now by Theorem A, uv vgv & wfv, and thus by Theorem B, wfv contains an individually rational countably additive payo measure. u
